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1. Introduction 18 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis, originated in the US subprime mortgage market and 19 
spread with devastating effects to the rest of the sectors of the US economy, as well as the 20 
global financial markets, is considered to be the most serious recession since World War 21 
II. The problem in the mortgage market, which was a relatively small part of the US 22 
economy, spread to other financial sectors through the Collateralized Mortgage 23 
Obligations (CMOs), which are a type of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The 24 
problems in the mortgage market became more pronounced by the presence of credit 25 
default swaps (CDS), which were used as an insurance contract for the various CMOs. The 26 
plunge of the prices in the mortgage markets caused the CMOs to drop in value and since 27 
the demand of CMOs was very low they were no longer being traded, making it difficult 28 
to price them. This triggered the protection payments of the CDSs and caused financial 29 
institutions to suffer great losses. The default of Lehman caused substantial turmoil to the 30 
global financial markets, leading to the failure of a number of financial institutions and 31 
investors selling high risk assets, such as stocks and derivative securities, causing a sharp 32 
drop in asset prices.  33 
There are numerous studies that examine how a crisis transmits through the CDS 34 
channel, as well as the degree of comovements between CDSs and other asset classes. 35 
Some recent research on the relationship between sovereign bonds and CDS includes those 36 
of Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff et al. (2011), and Ang and Longstaff (2013). A 37 
strand of literature that focuses on bank sector CDS includes those by Acharya et al. (2014) 38 
who focus on financial sector bailouts and document, using CDS data, that both bank and 39 
sovereign credit risks are linked. Similar results are provided by Kallestrup et al. (2016) 40 
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who highlight that sovereign CDS premiums are significantly affected by the foreign asset 41 
holdings of their domestic banks. Other studies include, those by Eichengreen et al. (2012) 42 
who focus on individual bank level CDS data to examine the international transmission 43 
channels of the US subprime crisis. In a related study, Dooley and Hutchison (2009) 44 
explore the effect of various news announcements on CDS spreads during the crisis. 45 
Furthermore, Jorion and Zhang (2007, 2009) use stock and CDS data to investigate the 46 
effects and various channels of credit contagion. Finally, Billio et al. (2014) examine the 47 
changes in sovereign and credit risk by analyzing the link between sovereign, bank and 48 
insurance sectors. 49 
The global financial crisis shows that a shock in a small part of the US economy was 50 
transmitted to the rest of the sectors of the economy and then spread globally. Such market 51 
comovements can have adverse effects to investors wishing to differentiate their portfolios, 52 
as well as on the decisions of domestic and international policy makers. The first goal of 53 
this study is to investigate whether contagion occurred across the European and the US 54 
financial markets after the shock of the  September 15th, 2008, which is the date when 55 
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, specifically between equity,  sovereign 56 
bond, bank sector CDS and insurance sector CDS markets. Secondly, the analysis 57 
investigates contagion patterns, which arise not only through linear dependence (i.e. 58 
correlation), but also through asymmetric and extremal cross market dependence. 59 
Specifically, in order to draw a more complete picture of contagion, the paper explores four 60 
different channels of contagion using statistical tests based on correlation, coskewness, 61 
cokurtosis and covolatility. Before shedding light to these issues, we briefly refer to the 62 
definition of contagion used in our analysis.  63 
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In this study we adopt the same definition for contagion as in Forbes and Rigobon 64 
(2002), namely “shift-contagion”. The authors distinguish between “normal” 65 
interdependence, which is a high level of interconnectedness across markets during all 66 
states of the world, and contagion which is a significant increase in cross-market linkages 67 
after a shock has occurred to one or more markets. The normal level of interdependence 68 
might be due to preexisting market linkages, such as trade channels, financial flows, and 69 
exposure to common shocks. The presence of “shift-contagion” implies that a shock, 70 
defined as a high volatility event, has caused the normal interconnectedness between 71 
markets to become unstable. The main advantage of this definition is that it provides a clear 72 
empirical framework, which allows us to test whether the linkages between two markets 73 
increased in the crisis period compared to the tranquil period prior to the crisis. 74 
Furthermore, it provides a broad view of contagion, which enables us to explore different 75 
channels of contagion, both linear and nonlinear. 1   76 
A decrease in asset returns and an increase in volatility is a common characteristic of a 77 
financial crisis. This is consistent with a risk-averse investor realizing higher returns in the 78 
pre-crisis period, in exchange for undertaking greater risk in the crisis period (see Sharpe, 79 
1964; Lintner, 1965; Black, 1972). The earliest tests for contagion (King and Wadhwani 80 
(1990)), focused on whether the cross-correlation between the asset returns of two markets 81 
changed during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. The base approach we 82 
use to examine for evidence of contagion across financial markets follows the correlation 83 
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analysis framework developed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who correct for the bias due 84 
to the presence of heteroskedasticity in market returns that is inherent in earlier correlation 85 
tests. 86 
However, there is considerable evidence that the distribution of asset returns cannot be 87 
adequately described by the first two moments (see among others Kraus and Litzenberger, 88 
1976 and Harvey and Siddique, 2000). Several authors (Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Smith, 89 
2007; Poti and Wang, 2010) show that coskewness and cokurtosis can be highly important 90 
dimensions of risk. Kostakis et al. (2012) document that stock returns with negative 91 
coskewness and positive cokurtosis values, i.e., with respect to the market portfolio returns, 92 
yield significant premiums over counterpart firms with positive coskewness and negative 93 
cokurtosis, respectively. An important characteristic of asset returns is that the return 94 
distribution after a shock switches from negative skewness to positive skewness, which can 95 
be attributed to investors preferring assets whose returns are right-skewed to asset returns 96 
that are left-skewed (Fry et al., 2010). An additional feature of asset returns is that they 97 
exhibit leptokurtic behavior, with kurtosis rising during the crisis period. Brunnermeier and 98 
Pedersen (2009) show that the lower kurtosis observed during the tranquil period is due to 99 
investors preferring securities with positive return and negative skewness. However, they 100 
find that after a crisis, investors end up holding securities with negative returns and 101 
negative skewness, leading to higher kurtosis. Fry et al. (2018) establish a theoretical 102 
motivation for testing for higher order moments by connecting the higher order comoments 103 
with the risk properties of agents’ utility functions. Hasler and Ornthanalai (2018) suggest 104 
that financial contagion arises because investors pay fluctuating attention to news. 105 
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Specifically, they show theoretically and empirically that as a negative shock hits one 106 
market, investors pay more attention to it.  107 
The first of the methodologies we use to search for transmission channels operating 108 
through higher order comoments, was developed by Fry et al. (2010), who propose a new 109 
class of tests for financial contagion based on changes in asymmetric dependence, which 110 
is measured by coskewness (the relationship between the returns and volatility). They show 111 
that the coskewness based tests identify additional transmission channels, which are not 112 
detected by tests based on correlation. More recently, Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018), 113 
develop a new line of tests based on extremal dependence. Their tests capture changes in 114 
various aspects of the distributions of asset returns, such as cokurtosis (the relationship 115 
between the returns and skewness) and covolatility (the relationship between the volatility 116 
of two markets). 117 
Our initial findings based on correlation tests indicate that contagion occurred both 118 
within and across European and US financial markets, with the US insurance sector CDS 119 
and European equities being the most affected. The coskewness test exposed new channels 120 
of contagion, particularly among bank and insurance CDS and also between them and the 121 
majority of the remaining indices. The results based on extremal dependence (i.e., 122 
cokurtosis and covolatility) revealed additional cross-market linkages which further 123 
underline the systemic importance of the bank and insurance sector. The cokurtosis tests 124 
showed that contagion was widespread within the US market, but also transmitted across 125 
US and European indices. Finally, the covolatility test found significant contagion effects, 126 
especially through the channels of the CDS, equity and bond markets.  127 
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The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 describes the tests for 128 
contagion used in this study. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical 129 
analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 130 
2. Methodological approaches 131 
This section provides a brief description of statistical tests used to examine linear and 132 
nonlinear channels of financial contagion. The linear (mean) channel of contagion is 133 
investigated using the correlation-based contagion tests proposed by Forbes and Ribogon 134 
(2002). Furthermore, the asymmetric dependence test developed by Fry et al (2010) are 135 
employed to study the coskewness channel of contagion. Lastly, the Fry-McKibbin and 136 
Hsiao (2018) extremal dependence tests are used to explore the cokurtosis and covolatility 137 
channels. 138 
Prior to testing for contagion, the sample is divided into two sets, the tranquil period 139 
prior to the crisis and the period after the occurrence of the shock (i.e. the crisis period). 140 
The pre- and crisis periods are denoted as 𝑥 and 𝑦. The sample sizes are 𝑇 for the full 141 
sample, 𝑇𝑥 for the pre-crisis period and 𝑇𝑦 for the crisis period. The correlation between 142 
the asset returns for the two markets is 𝜌𝑥 for the non-crisis period and 𝜌𝑦 for the crisis 143 
period. Let the source asset market be denoted as 𝑖 and the recipient market of contagion 144 
as 𝑗. The asset returns are 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑟𝑗 for markets 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively. The means of asset 145 
returns for 𝑖 and 𝑗 during the pre- and crisis periods are 𝜇𝑥,𝑖, 𝜇𝑥,𝑗, 𝜇𝑦,𝑖 and 𝜇𝑦,𝑗, while the 146 
standard deviations of asset returns for 𝑖 and 𝑗 during the pre- and crisis periods are 𝜎𝑥,𝑖, 147 
𝜎𝑥,𝑗, 𝜎𝑦,𝑖 and 𝜎𝑦,𝑗. 148 
2.1 Contagion test based on changes in correlation 149 
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Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define contagion as an increase in the heteroskedasticity 150 
adjusted correlation coefficient, which is defined as: 151 
𝑣𝑦 =
𝜌𝑦
√1 + 𝛿(1 − 𝜌𝑦2)





2                              (1) 152 
The authors estimate a vector autoregressive model (VAR) model and use the variance-153 
covariance estimates from this model to calculate the unconditional correlation coefficient 154 
between the market where the shock originated and a recipient market. Furthermore, they 155 
make the assumptions that there are no omitted variables and endogeneityand use 𝑡-tests 156 
to examine if there is a significant increase in any of the correlation coefficients during the 157 
crisis period. The “no contagion” null, 𝐻0: 𝑣𝑦 = 𝜌𝑥, against the “contagion” alternative, 158 
𝐻1: 𝑣𝑦 > 𝜌𝑥,  is tested using the following statistic:   159 

















.                                       (3) 160 
The Forbes and Ribogon (2002), 𝐹𝑅(𝑖 → 𝑗), statistic examines the linear (correlation) 161 
channel of contagion. Specifically, it tests for contagion from the expected returns of 162 
market 𝑖 to the expected returns of market 𝑗. 163 
 2.2 Contagion tests based on changes in coskewness 164 
Fry et al. (2010) argue that linear (correlations) channel  is  not enough to fully reveal 165 
all  patterns of contagion, and that important information can be obtained from asymmetric 166 
dependence.  The coskewness channel of contagion captures changes in coskewness which 167 
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emerge from the interaction between expected returns and volatility across markets. To 168 
explore the coskewness channel of contagion Fry et al. (2010) developed the following 169 
statistic:  170 
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,      𝑘 = 𝑥, 𝑦,                  (5) 172 
𝑚, 𝑛 = 1, 2  and 𝑣𝑦 the estimator of 𝑣𝑦 defined in (1).  173 
The 𝐶𝑆12  (𝐶𝑆21)  coskewness contagion test examines whether a change to the expected 174 
returns (volatility) of the source market led to a change to the volatility (expected returns) 175 
of the recipient market. To test whether there is a significant change in coskewness, they 176 









𝑛) ,           (7) 178 
where 𝑚, 𝑛 = 1, 2. Under the null hypothesis of “no contagion”, coskewness contagion 179 




2.3 Contagion tests based on changes in cokurtosis 181 
The coskewness test is not always enough to capture the full scope of contagion. 182 
Additional transmission channels may arise through extremal dependence.  The cokurtosis 183 
channel of contagion captures the interaction between expected returns and skewness 184 
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across markets. To detect contagion from the source market 𝑖 to the recipient market 𝑗 185 
through the cokurtosis channel Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) suggest the following 186 
statistic: 187 






























𝑛) − (3?̂?𝑥),           (9) 189 
𝑚, 𝑛 = 1, 3 and 𝑣𝑦 the estimator of 𝑣𝑦 defined in (1).  190 
The first (second) statistic, 𝐶𝐾13 (𝐶𝐾31), detects contagion from the expected returns 191 
(skewness) of the source market 𝑖 to the skewness (expected returns) of the recipient market 192 










𝑛).           (10) 195 
Under the null hypothesis of “no contagion”, tests of contagion based on changes in 196 




2.4 Contagion test based on changes in covolatility 198 
Changes in the relation between the returns volatility of one market with the returns 199 
volatility of another market from negative to positive after the shock has occurred, reveals 200 
the volatility smile effect through the covolatility channel in the crisis period. The 201 
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covolatility statistic, proposed by Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018), for testing for 202 
contagion from market 𝑖 to market 𝑗 is given by the following equation: 203 
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2) − (3?̂?𝑥).       (12) 205 
To test whether there is a significant change in covolatility, the following hypotheses 206 









2).                (13) 208 
Under the null hypothesis of “no contagion”, tests of contagion based on changes in 209 




3. Data and empirical analysis 211 
The dataset is composed of daily observations of the equity, volatility, government 212 
bond, insurance sector CDS and bank sector CDS indices for Europe and the US. The 213 
analysis focuses on assets in relevance to the banking sector, thus exemplified the role of 214 
this sector in stressful times. In particular, many studies exemplify the fact that crisis events 215 
usually trigger systemic events through the banking sector, while several authors have 216 
identified strong evidence that bank values co-vary both in tranquil, but mainly in stressful 217 
periods, either as a result of common shocks, or as a consequence of trouble at one bank 218 
(Iyer and Peydro, 2011). Moreover, explanations of systemic risk fall into three broad and 219 
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overlapping categories. The first defines systemic risk as exposure to a common shock. If 220 
all banks have an exposure to commercial real estate loans, then a shock to the real estate 221 
sector causes losses to every bank in the system with serious detrimental effects to the real 222 
economy. This type of exposure could arise as a natural consequence of bank 223 
diversification (Wagner, 2010), or it could also reflect a strategic decision to take advantage 224 
of limited liability so as to externalise some of the costs of failure (Acharya, 2009), or to 225 
capitalise upon the regulator’s unwillingness to allow many banks to fail together (Acharya 226 
and Yorulmazer, 2007; Farhi and Tirole, 2012). The second approach to systemic risk is 227 
concerned with structural funding risks in the banking sector. Precisely, because banks 228 
fund long-lived and hard-to-sell assets with short-dated deposits and wholesale loans, they 229 
are exposed to runs, either by depositors or short-term bank lenders. It is well-understood 230 
that an unexpectedly large withdrawal of funds can cause bank insolvency (Diamond and 231 
Dybvig, 1983). When such phenomena happen, a problem that could have been contained 232 
within a few banks is transmitted to the entire banking sector, and causes widespread bank 233 
failure (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000). Finally, a final strand of 234 
the literature on contagion concentrates upon the topology of the networks through which 235 
shocks are transmitted. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) show that densely-236 
connected networks are better able to absorb small shocks, but that they amplify the effects 237 
of larger shocks, such as crisis events. May, Levin, and Sugihara (2008) and Haldane and 238 
May (2011) explain the propagation of shocks through banking. 239 
All indices are retrieved from Datastream and reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 240 
Specifically, the two equity indices are the Euro Stoxx 50 index (EUEQ) and the S&P 500 241 
index (USEQ), for Europe and the US respectively. The VSTOXX (EUVOL) is a volatility 242 
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index based on option prices on the Euro Stoxx 50 index, while the CBOE volatility index 243 
or VIX (USVOL) is based on options written on the S&P 500 index. The bond indices for 244 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the US (EMUGB and USGB respectively) are 245 
based on five-year sovereign bonds. Finally, the credit default swaps indices are based on 246 
Thomson Reuter’s five-year CDS data for the European and US bank (EUBCDS and 247 
USBCDS) and insurance sectors (EUICDS and USICDS). We compute the continuously 248 
compounded daily returns for all indices, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡, using the formula: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln (𝑝𝑖,𝑡/𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 ), 249 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 denotes the daily closing price of index 𝑖 on day 𝑡. The mean, standard deviation, 250 
skewness, kurtosis and correlation coefficients of 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 for the pre- and crisis periods are 251 
reported in Table A2 of the Appendix. 252 
The sample period is set from January 15, 2004 to January 14, 2012, for a total of 2088 253 
observations. The crisis event is set to September 15, 2008, which is the date when Lehman 254 
Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Therefore, the sample is divided into two periods 255 
at the date when the shock occurred; the pre-crisis period from January 15, 2004 to 256 
September 15, 2008 and the crisis period from September 16, 2008 to January 14, 2012, 257 
for a total of 1044 observations for each sub-period. Overall, we observe from Table A2 258 
that all indices became more volatile, since the standard deviation increased during the 259 
period after the shock, compared to the tranquil period. 260 
We apply the econometric methodology described in Section 2, to investigate linear and 261 
nonlinear channels of contagion between European and US markets during the global 262 
financial crisis. There are three cases of contagion examined: i) contagion across European 263 
financial markets, ii) contagion across US financial markets, and iii) contagion between 264 
European and US financial markets. 265 
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To compute the Forbes and Rigobon test statistics as well as the adjusted unconditional 266 
correlation coefficient needed for the coskewness, cokurtosis and covolatility tests, the 267 
daily market returns are filtered with a 29-lag VAR model2. The residuals estimated from 268 
the VAR model are used in computing the tests of contagion. 269 
The results of the tests of contagion are presented in Tables 1 to 4. In each of the tables, 270 
the first column indicates the source market, while the first line features the recipient 271 
market. Furthermore, in each table, the upper left quarter and the lower right quarter report 272 
the test results for contagion within Europe and the US, respectively. The other two 273 
quarters refer to the contagion test results across Europe and the US. The figures are test 274 
statistics values, while those in parenthesis are p-values. The null hypothesis is “no 275 
contagion” and the rejection of the null hypothesis implies that contagion has occurred. 276 
4.1 Results of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correlation test 277 
Table 1 presents the empirical results of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test, which 278 
examines contagion from the expected returns of one market to the expected returns of a 279 
second market, based on a significant change in cross-correlation. The empirical findings 280 
illustrate that only 26 out of the 90 entries indicate contagion at the 5% significance level.  281 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 282 
Within Europe, results suggest the presence of contagion between the equity index and 283 
the bank and insurance CDS indices. Furthermore, significant contagion effects occurred 284 
from the insurance sector CDS to the bank sector CDS index and from the government 285 
                                                          




bond to the equity index. Within the US, it is evident that shocks propagate between the 286 
insurance sector CDS index and all other indices, with the exception of the equity index, 287 
which is affected only by the bank CDS index. As for contagion across regions, we observe 288 
that contagion runs from the US insurance CDS market to all the European indices, with 289 
the exception of the equity index. By contrast, the US insurance CDS index is affected by 290 
both European CDS indices and the volatility index. In addition, contagion is transmitted 291 
to the European equity index running from the US bank CDS, sovereign bond and volatility 292 
indices. Finally, contagion spreads from the European bank CDS index to the US equity 293 
index and between the sovereign bond indices in both regions. 294 
4.2 Results of the Fry et al. (2010) coskewness test 295 
Tables 2a and 2b present the results for the coskewness tests of contagion. Results reveal 296 
additional evidence of contagion through the coskewness channel, with 56 entries in each 297 
table having a p-value less than the 5% significance level. The findings of the coskewness 298 
tests indicate the systemic importance of the banking and insurance sectors (see Gropp and 299 
Moerman, 2004 and Allen and Carletti, 2006, respectively), with contagion affects being 300 
prominent among bank and insurance CDS and also between the CDS and the majority of 301 
the remaining indices, for both regions. 302 
[Insert Tables 2a and 2b about here] 303 
The  𝐶𝑆12 test results highlight the contagion linkages from the expected of one market 304 
(source) to the volatility of a second market (recipient).  It is evident that among the 305 
European markets such contagion links originate from the sovereign bond and volatility 306 
indices towards the equity index, while the volatility index is also affected by the equity 307 
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index. The sovereign bond index remains unaffected by the rest of the European indices. 308 
For the US markets, apart from the bank and insurance CDS channels, contagion is found 309 
to transmit from the equity index to the sovereign bond index. The 𝐶𝑆12 test reveals further 310 
contagion channels across the two regions, with the EMU sovereign bond and equity 311 
markets affecting the US sovereign bond market, while the US volatility index is affected 312 
by the European bond and volatility indices. Significant effects of contagion are revealed 313 
from the US equity and sovereign bond sectors towards their European counterparts and 314 
from the US volatility index to the European equity index. The European volatility index 315 
is unaffected by any of the US indices. 316 
The results of the 𝐶𝑆21 test, which detects contagion from the volatility of one market 317 
to the expected returns of a second market, are reported in Table 2b. Again, we find  318 
significant evidence of contagion through the coskewness channel, originating from the 319 
European and US banking and insurance sectors to the majority of the remaining indices. 320 
Specifically, for the European region the 𝐶𝑆21 test detects significant contagion patterns, 321 
from the equity market to all other markets and from the volatility index to the bank sector 322 
CDS and equity indices. The EMU sovereign bond index does not seem to affect any of 323 
the other indices. In the case of the US, additional linkages include those from the sovereign 324 
bond index to all indices except the volatility index, and from the equity index to the bank 325 
sector CDS index. Regarding additional contagion links across the two regions, the 326 
contagion effects that are most prominent, originate from both sovereign bond indices and 327 
the European equity index. 328 
4.3 Results of the Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) cokurtosis test 329 
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The results for the extremal dependence tests based on cokurtosis and presented in 330 
Tables 3a and 3b, provide strong evidence of contagion through the fourth-order 331 
comoments. The cokurtosis tests reveal an even greater number of cross-market contagion 332 
linkages during the global financial crisis compared to those detected from the coskewness 333 
tests. Specifically, the 𝐶𝐾13 test (Table 3a) and 𝐶𝐾31 test (Table 3b) detect 77 and 75 334 
contagion links, respectively.  335 
 [Insert Tables 3a and 3b about here] 336 
According to the 𝐶𝐾13 test which captures contagion from the expected returns of the 337 
source market to the skewness of the recipient market, the European bank sector CDS, the 338 
insurance sector CDS and volatility indices are affected by all European indices. The equity 339 
index is not affected only by the volatility index. On the other hand, contagion is 340 
transmitted to the sovereign bond index only from the equity index. In the US region, 341 
contagion is present across all markets during the global financial crisis. Shocks originating 342 
from European markets returns spread towards all US markets skewness, with the 343 
exception of the US equity index which is unaffected by both European CDS indices and 344 
the US volatility index, which is unaffected by the European equity index. Contagion 345 
spread towards the European bank and insurance CDS indices from all US indices, while 346 
the EMU sovereign bond index is affected by its US counterpart and the US bank CDS 347 
index. Moreover, contagion transmits from all US markets, except from the sovereign bond 348 
index, to the European equity index. Finally, contagion spreads to the European volatility 349 
index from the US insurance CDS, equity and volatility indices. 350 
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Similar results are obtained from the 𝐶𝐾31 test, which detects contagion from the 351 
skewness of the source market to the expected return of the recipient market. In particular, 352 
in Europe, changes in cokurtosis are prominent from the bank CDS, insurance CDS, equity 353 
indices and to a lesser extent from the volatility index, with the bond index affecting only 354 
the equity index. Contagion is widespread across all financial markets in the US, with the 355 
exception of the US insurance CDS and equity indices that do not affect the equity and 356 
volatility indices respectively. Contagion effects spread from the European and US bank 357 
and insurance CDS indices towards the financial markets of both regions. Furthermore, 358 
contagion transmits from the European equity markets to all US markets and from the US 359 
government bond and volatility indices to all European indices. The effects of contagion 360 
are less prominent when the EMU sovereign bond and European volatility and the US 361 
equity channels are considered as origins.  362 
4.4 Results of the Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) covolatility test 363 
The results for the covolatility test, which examines significant changes in volatility 364 
spillovers after a shock, are reported in Table 4. Overall, the results suggest contagion 365 
patterns similar to those obtained for the cokurtosis channel. Specifically, 76 entries in 366 
Table 4 support the contagion hypothesis through the covolatility channel. This result 367 
suggests that the effects of the global financial crisis were widespread across all markets 368 
for both regions, especially through the banking and insurance sector CDS channels as 369 
indicated by the magnitude of the 𝐶𝑉22 statistic. 370 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 371 
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In Europe, contagion transmits among all indices, with no evidence of contagion to the 372 
equity index from the volatility index. Furthermore, the covolatility test does not detect any 373 
contagion between the volatility of the two CDS indices and the volatility of the sovereign 374 
bond index. In the US, contagion is spread across all financial markets, with the value of 375 
the covolatility statistics related to the bank and insurance sectors being significantly 376 
higher. Based on the covolatility test, contagion across both regions is similarly extensive. 377 
The channels of contagion that are more prominent include the European insurance sector 378 
CDS, sovereign bond and volatility indices and the US bank sector CDS, sovereign bond 379 
and volatility indices. 380 
The obtained results for the case of the US are consistent with the increasing uncertainty 381 
fueled by events, such as the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. This type of 382 
uncertainty persists, in spite of certain actions taken by the Federal Reserve and other 383 
central banks to increase liquidity available to banks. The high levels of uncertainty are 384 
also fed by the increasing instability in the European banking sector, while it also spreads 385 
to the equity market. Similar results are taken for the European markets, given that the 386 
European Central Bank did not match the actions taken by the Fed to provide higher levels 387 
of liquidity, both for the European banking sector and the real economy (Bartram and 388 
Bonard, 2009). At the same time, the presence of extended contagion clearly supports that 389 
the benefits of risk diversification diminished during crisis periods. In addition, the 390 
presence of contagion across markets is a proof of strong evidence for the ‘wake-up call’ 391 
hypothesis, which opens up the intriguing possibility that government policies can mitigate 392 
contagion (Goldstein et al., 2000), since domestic fundamentals are likely to play a 393 
dominant role in the transmission of the crisis. If macro-fundamentals matter during a 394 
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crisis, cross-country differences in government policies (i.e., as in the case between US and 395 
Eurozone) could potentially explain the relative exposure to the crisis. Strong contagion 396 
can also be explained in the case where European firms are in sectors that are highly 397 
integrated with US markets, such as technology. The findings are also very indicative for 398 
the validity of the ‘banking channel’ hypothesis for global contagion during the crisis. A 399 
number of authors have stressed the importance of this channel, even for equity market 400 
contagion (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001;  Tong and Wei, 2009; among others).  401 
A central element of the crisis was a freezing of credit and inter-bank markets and a 402 
liquidity squeeze that made it difficult for financial and non-financial institutions to obtain 403 
capital. This finding is closely related to the literature that stresses the role of (il)liquidity 404 
in causing or exacerbating crise events (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Brunnermeier and 405 
Pedersen, 2009). The effect of such banking problems also clearly indicates firms with 406 
financing constraints, as well as firms with more interest rate exposures, as they may have 407 
shorter maturity debt and thus face steeper refinancing costs (Almeida et al., 2012). Finally, 408 
the results are in relevance to the concepts of risk aversion and liquidity. In particular, the 409 
risk aversion of investors (proxied by the VIX index in our case) may substantially increase 410 
during the crisis, making them shun risky assets and flee into safer assets, particularly, 411 
government bonds (Baker et al., 2009; Bekaert et al., 2011).  412 
4. Concluding remarks 413 
This study used the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correlation test, the Fry et al. (2010) 414 
coskewness test, and the Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) cokurtosis and covolatility tests 415 
to examine contagion across European and US financial markets. The 2008 crisis was 416 
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selected to be the decisive crisis event, while data on bank sector’s CDS, insurance sector’s 417 
CDS, sovereign bond, equity and volatility indices spanning the period 2004 to 2012 were 418 
used. Our initial results based on the correlation test show that contagion occurred across 419 
financial markets during the global financial crisis, especially through the channels of the 420 
insurance and equity sectors. However, higher order moment contagion tests revealed 421 
linkages across markets that were not previously detected when using correlation based 422 
tests. The additional channels of contagion most prominently supported by the asymmetric 423 
and extremal dependence tests were that of the bank and insurance CDS sectors. 424 
The empirical findings allow identifying contagion across financial markets and regions 425 
and could be helpful for the design of specific stabilization policies. The tests generated 426 
results as an additional tool for regulators and policy makers to assess the effectiveness of 427 
their policies and the communication of their actions. In particular, our findings carry 428 
important implications for investors, policy makers and international organizations, such 429 
as International Monetary Fund (IMF), with regard to the linkages among the markets and 430 
their real economy sectors. For instance, investors may benefit from the different 431 
vulnerability of the markets and real economy sectors, since holding a portfolio with 432 
equities from diverse sectors is less subject to systematic risks. From policymakers and 433 
international organizations’ perspective, the results provided useful information about the 434 
directions for possible future policy decisions to protect countries and investors from future 435 
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Table 1: The Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 𝐹𝑅(𝑖 → 𝑗) correlation-based contagion test results 580 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
0.08 3.95 -7.46 6.86 3.99 -5.16 0.61 -3.67 5.10   
(0.53) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.00) (1.00) 
EUICDS -2.22 
 
2.73 -4.20 3.48 2.36 -4.21 0.60 -1.26 2.23  
(0.01) 
 
(1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.73) (0.10) (0.99) 
EMUGB 2.53 2.69 
 
-3.26 2.60 3.18 -1.26 -3.93 -1.08 2.75  
(0.99) (1.00) 
 
(0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.14) (1.00) 
26 
 
EUEQ -2.77 -1.76 -0.21 
 
7.37 -1.47 4.12 1.26 -1.51 1.96  
(0.00) (0.04) (0.42) 
 
(1.00) (0.07) (1.00) (0.90) (0.07) (0.98) 
EUVOL 4.99 3.24 2.37 3.26 
 
3.07 -2.30 0.50 1.04 1.56 
  (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (1.00) 
 
(1.00) (0.01) (0.69) (0.85) (0.94) 
USBCDS 3.97 3.49 4.47 -5.75 4.73 
 
-3.01 4.09 -4.96 4.41  
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) 
 
(0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) 
USICDS -6.59 -5.70 -2.36 4.67 -3.42 -5.52 
 
-4.36 4.69 -4.33  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (1.00) (0.00) 
USGB 0.12 0.91 -3.09 -1.69 1.22 3.36 -3.60 
 
-0.38 1.66  
(0.55) (0.82) (0.00) (0.05) (0.89) (1.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.35) (0.95) 
USEQ -0.72 0.21 0.74 -0.94 3.32 -0.86 3.87 2.31 
 
7.55  
(0.24) (0.58) (0.77) (0.17) (1.00) (0.19) (1.00) (0.99) 
 
(1.00) 
USVOL 4.33 2.69 3.37 -2.47 3.01 3.47 -2.27 1.67 2.38 
 
  (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.01) (1.00) (1.00) (0.01) (0.95) (0.99) 
 
Notes: The 𝐹𝑅(𝑖 → 𝑗) test measures contagion from the expected returns of market 𝑖 to the expected returns of market 𝑗. 
The first column indicates the source market, while the first row indicates the recipient market. The null hypothesis is “no 
contagion”. The figures denote the test statistics values, while those in parenthesis are the p-values. Figures in bold indicate 
the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the 
European and US bank sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance sector CDS indices, respectively.  
EMUGB and USGB are the EMU and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL are the 
European and US equity and volatility indices, respectively. 
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Table 2.a: The Fry et al. (2010) 𝐶𝑆12 coskewness-based test results 582 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
1304.96 1.71 35.86 5.79 41.24 188.61 8.93 5.23 0.81   
(0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.37) 
EUICDS 413.70 
 
3.52 16.43 1.16 163.87 4.77 8.39 6.93 3.43  
(0.00) 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) 
EMUGB 18.84 84.76 
 
4.82 0.21 79.11 0.90 24.94 0.47 6.33  
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.03) (0.64) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.49) (0.01) 
EUEQ 47.46 60.92 3.42 
 
15.18 49.33 5.38 21.88 0.27 0.80  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.61) (0.37) 
EUVOL 54.17 103.41 0.02 25.53 
 
48.29 65.39 2.78 0.05 7.29 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.82) (0.01) 
USBCDS 34.36 17.95 5.85 2.18 0.04 
 
16.50 27.99 9.88 2.34  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.14) (0.83) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) 
USICDS 32.85 52.58 1.79 0.55 1.71 146.36 
 
25.96 0.06 0.55  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.46) (0.19) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.81) (0.46) 




(0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.30) (0.51) 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) 
 
(0.75) 
USVOL 31.25 56.83 0.00 4.20 2.15 8.97 3.69 2.14 1.30 
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.04) (0.14) (0.00) (0.05) (0.14) (0.25) 
 
Notes: The 𝐶𝑆12 statistic measures contagion from the expected returns of market 𝑖 to the volatility of market 𝑗. The first 
column indicates the source market, while the first row indicates the recipient market. The null hypothesis is “no 
contagion”. The figures denote the test statistics values, while those in parenthesis are the p-values. Figures in bold indicate 
the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the 
European and US bank sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance sector CDS indices, respectively.  EMUGB 
and USGB are the EMU and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL are the European and 
US equity and volatility indices, respectively. 
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Table 2.b: The Fry et al. (2010) 𝐶𝑆21 coskewness-based test results 584 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
396.55 18.24 42.32 51.70 34.35 32.54 8.76 21.45 30.69   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EUICDS 1361.37 
 
84.69 57.60 102.83 18.39 51.91 1.56 45.72 57.37  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) 
EMUGB 1.76 3.52 
 
3.18 0.02 6.03 1.78 16.70 5.32 0.00  
(0.18) (0.06) 
 
(0.07) (0.89) (0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.02) (0.99) 
EUEQ 40.22 17.38 5.17 
 
27.22 2.41 0.54 11.48 6.05 4.61  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
 
(0.00) (0.12) (0.46) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
EUVOL 6.07 1.16 0.22 14.25 
 
0.05 1.69 0.82 1.20 2.21 
  (0.01) (0.28) (0.64) (0.00) 
 
(0.83) (0.19) (0.36) (0.27) (0.14) 
USBCDS 41.25 159.96 76.84 44.57 46.44 
 
142.25 171.26 40.16 8.77  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USICDS 190.42 4.84 0.91 5.40 65.93 16.97 
 
58.75 0.45 3.77  
(0.00) (0.03) (0.34) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.50) (0.05) 
USGB 9.01 8.35 24.52 20.53 2.73 28.46 25.87 
 
27.85 2.14  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.14) 
USEQ 5.57 7.12 0.48 0.26 0.05 10.88 0.06 1.12 
 
1.40  
(0.02) (0.01) (0.49) (0.61) (0.82) (0.00) (0.81) (0.29) 
 
(0.24) 
USVOL 0.83 3.40 6.24 0.72 7.09 2.39 0.54 0.44 0.10 
 
  (0.36) (0.07) (0.01) (0.39) (0.01) (0.12) (0.46) (0.51) (0.75) 
 
Notes: The 𝐶𝑆21 statistic measures contagion from the volatility of market 𝑖 to the expected returns of market 𝑗. The first 
column indicates the source market, while the first row indicates the recipient market. The null hypothesis is “no 
contagion”. The figures denote the test statistics values, while those in parenthesis are the p-values. Figures in bold indicate 
the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the 
European and US bank sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance sector CDS indices, respectively.  EMUGB 
and USGB are the EMU and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL are the European and 
US equity and volatility indices, respectively. 
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Table 3.a: The Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) 𝐶𝐾13 cokurtosis-based test results 586 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
10205.55 3.33 225.57 87.79 3993.37 46997.36 229.70 2.48 266.04   
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) 
EUICDS 10.90 
 
0.05 302.17 88.73 5253.58 1266.01 170.67 0.20 151.76  
(0.00) 
 
(0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) 
EMUGB 164.54 3211.12 
 
13.68 10.32 3481.81 55.63 48.76 8.15 38.43  
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EUEQ 1350.96 5.49 20.81 
 
7.65 1252.60 6320.21 29.55 18.24 1.80  
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) 
EUVOL 636.94 934.60 0.05 0.62 
 
1058.75 16549.73 95.17 7.99 160.18 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.83) (0.43) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USBCDS 720.40 555.37 128.26 55.08 3.02 
 
1042.38 775.14 50.92 10.15  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USICDS 258.18 809.10 0.79 23.58 5.61 3126.96 
 
131.41 61.31 82.75  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USGB 39.50 1944.80 11.63 0.15 2.28 5557.75 24231.76 
 
51.34 44.93  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
USEQ 93.85 2793.20 0.06 55.22 8.13 1622.13 6.82 174.29 
 
109.27  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
USVOL 523.22 4687.21 1.52 53.89 3.94 555.55 216.70 129.23 4.50 
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
 
Notes: The 𝐶𝐾13 statistic measures contagion from the expected returns of market 𝑖 to the skewness of market 𝑗. The first 
column indicates the source market, while the first row indicates the recipient market. The null hypothesis is “no 
contagion”. The figures denote the test statistics values, while those in parenthesis are the p-values. Figures in bold indicate 
the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the 
European and US bank sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance sector CDS indices, respectively.  EMUGB 
and USGB are the EMU and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL are the European and 
US equity and volatility indices, respectively. 
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Table 3.b: The Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) 𝐶𝐾31 cokurtosis-based test results 588 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
4.21 125.92 914.18 520.57 719.11 308.62 45.92 40.40 477.32 
  
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EUICDS 11006.74 
 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EMUGB 0.27 0.07 
 




(0.04) (0.98) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.13) (0.51) 
EUEQ 411.81 417.99 39.94 
 
6.70 139.91 17.65 5.62 60.84 116.37 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
EUVOL 128.75 93.91 11.70 0.92 
 
11.16 1.07 0.66 1.10 7.56 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) 
 
(0.00) (0.30) (0.42) (0.29) (0.01) 
USBCDS 3997.72 4912.87 3196.39 863.71 908.55 
 
2709.77 5323.97 1184.48 503.81 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USICDS 46946.15 1171.86 38.22 6252.11 16410.84 910.03 
 
24068.79 2.85 299.40 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 




(0.16) (0.26) (0.25) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.87) 
USVOL 298.10 138.26 30.82 16.61 173.17 6.05 126.62 45.00 142.88 
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Notes: The 𝐶𝐾31 statistic measures contagion from the skewness of market 𝑖 to the expected returns of market 𝑗. The first 
column indicates the source market, while the first row indicates the recipient market. The null hypothesis is “no contagion”. 
The figures denote the test statistics values, while those in parenthesis are the p-values. Figures in bold indicate the rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the European and US bank 
sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance sector CDS indices, respectively.  EMUGB and USGB are the EMU 
and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL are the European and US equity and volatility indices, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: The Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao (2018) 𝐶𝑉22 covolatility-based test results 590 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
229.00 0.13 523.45 319.00 1857.76 0.01 276.95 0.00 240.38 
  
(0.00) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) 
EUICDS 279.26 
 




(0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) 
EMUGB 1.32 0.13 
 




(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
EUEQ 794.08 174.53 17.30 
 
6.45 150.02 216.53 14.17 26.20 47.60  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EUVOL 389.99 77.52 6.16 0.68 
 
213.37 1.27 35.46 7.94 13.08 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.41) 
 
(0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USBCDS 1858.34 2572.81 740.16 180.83 224.61 
 
2023.26 3433.33 649.03 119.23  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
USICDS 0.01 573.38 316.83 215.52 0.89 2068.64 
 
126.80 306.08 143.90 
 
(0.92) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 




(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
USVOL 261.98 1.72 4.82 17.70 17.70 112.47 150.35 37.04 34.44 
 
  (0.00) (0.19) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Notes: The 𝐶𝑉22 statistic measures contagion from the volatility of market 𝑖 to the volatility of market 𝑗. The first column 
indicates the source market, while the first row indicates the recipient market. The null hypothesis is “no contagion”. The 
figures denote the test statistics values, while those in parenthesis are the p-values. Figures in bold indicate the rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the European and US 
bank sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance sector CDS indices, respectively.  EMUGB and USGB are 
the EMU and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL are the European and US equity and 
volatility indices, respectively. 





Table A1: Sources of the financial sector indices 594 
  Europe United States 
Equity Index EUEQ EURO STOXX 50 Index  
(DJES50I) 
USEQ S&P 500 Index  
(S&PCOMP) 
Volatility Index EUVOL EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index  
(VSTOXXI) 




EMUGB EMU Benchmark 5 yr. DS Gov. Index  
(BMEM05Y) 
USGB US Benchmark 5 yr. DS Gov. Index  
(BMUS05Y) 
Bank Sector CDS 
Index 
EUBCDS EU Bank Sector  5 yr. DS CDS Index  
(EUBANCD) 




EUICDS EU Insur. Sector 5 yr. DS CDS Index  
(EUINSCD) 
USICDS US Insur. Sector 5 yr. DS CDS Index  
(USINSCD) 
Notes: The code inside the bracket below the name of the index indicates the Datastream mnemonic of the index. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics 596 
Descriptive statistics for the pre-crisis period 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
 Mean 0.00249 0.00129 -0.00001 0.00012 0.00067 0.00249 0.00236 0.00003 0.00005 0.00081 
 Std. Dev. 0.03597 0.04119 0.00184 0.01029 0.05218 0.05184 0.04092 0.00270 0.00901 0.06294 
 Skewness 1.08343 2.15014 -0.00364 -0.44000 0.86925 -1.29980 0.37288 0.11097 -0.35873 0.70450 
 Kurtosis 13.52152 30.95665 4.46548 8.23201 6.10058 31.48781 10.81201 6.21038 5.92657 8.84771 
Pre-crisis period correlation 
 
EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
0.72234 0.25889 -0.27970 0.22759 0.25855 0.47809 0.16923 -0.11494 0.07295 
EUICDS 0.72234 
 
0.21822 -0.24623 0.24796 0.23395 0.44325 0.14435 -0.12052 0.10481 
EMUGB 0.25889 0.21822 
 
-0.41113 0.33382 0.23485 0.21193 0.57167 -0.25156 0.18963 
EUEQ -0.27970 -0.24623 -0.41113 
 
-0.81312 -0.31983 -0.29414 -0.31168 0.48355 -0.40025 
EUVOL 0.22759 0.24796 0.33382 -0.81312 
 
0.26928 0.24540 0.26541 -0.43123 0.45215 
USBCDS 0.25855 0.23395 0.23485 -0.31983 0.26928 
 
0.41385 0.20792 -0.30103 0.24239 
USICDS 0.47809 0.44325 0.21193 -0.29414 0.24540 0.41385 
 
0.21967 -0.27450 0.22736 
USGB 0.16923 0.14435 0.57167 -0.31168 0.26541 0.20792 0.21967 
 
-0.39973 0.30151 
USEQ -0.11494 -0.12052 -0.25156 0.48355 -0.43123 -0.30103 -0.27450 -0.39973 
 
-0.80914 
USVOL 0.07295 0.10481 0.18963 -0.40025 0.45215 0.24239 0.22736 0.30151 -0.80914   
Descriptive statistics for the crisis period 
  EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
 Mean 0.00067 0.00011 0.00017 -0.00019 -0.00042 -0.00082 -0.00067 0.00015 0.00020 -0.00075 
 Std. Dev. 0.04019 0.04564 0.00236 0.01867 0.06374 0.05409 0.09494 0.00323 0.01715 0.07185 
 Skewness -0.15719 -5.37533 -0.03285 0.13490 0.78845 0.02789 -13.31658 -0.14018 -0.26795 0.71784 
 Kurtosis 22.51380 92.85061 4.46621 7.18374 5.95402 24.86864 343.39414 8.29233 10.25302 6.62651 
Crisis period correlation 
 
EUBCDS EUICDS EMUGB EUEQ EUVOL USBCDS USICDS USGB USEQ USVOL 
EUBCDS 
 
0.60832 0.36477 -0.44636 0.40099 0.32821 0.11397 0.22223 -0.27716 0.30077 
EUICDS 0.60832 
 
0.36786 -0.45636 0.40668 0.32986 0.16366 0.23029 -0.29239 0.29589 
EMUGB 0.36477 0.36786 
 
-0.57288 0.49242 0.36373 0.15568 0.51138 -0.37422 0.37924 
EUEQ -0.44636 -0.45636 -0.57288 
 
-0.77119 -0.50831 -0.17755 -0.39571 0.66127 -0.56285 
EUVOL 0.40099 0.40668 0.49242 -0.77119 
 
0.43517 0.16356 0.31991 -0.46778 0.60427 
USBCDS 0.32821 0.32986 0.36373 -0.50831 0.43517 
 
0.20890 0.33023 -0.45004 0.44172 
USICDS 0.11397 0.16366 0.15568 -0.17755 0.16356 0.20890 
 
0.09676 -0.16462 0.18187 
USGB 0.22223 0.23029 0.51138 -0.39571 0.31991 0.33023 0.09676 
 
-0.40409 0.36259 
USEQ -0.27716 -0.29239 -0.37422 0.66127 -0.46778 -0.45004 -0.16462 -0.40409 
 
-0.76845 
USVOL 0.30077 0.29589 0.37924 -0.56285 0.60427 0.44172 0.18187 0.36259 -0.76845   
Notes: EUBCDS, USBCDS and EUICDS, USICDS are the European and US bank sector CDS indices, and the European and US insurance 
sector CDS indices, respectively.  EMUGB and USGB are the EMU and the US sovereign bond indices. EUEQ, USEQ and EUVOL, USVOL 
are the European and US equity and volatility indices, respectively. 
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